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In June of 1972, Title IX surfaced under the Education Amendments of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Title IX emerged to eliminate sex-based discrimination in environments receiving 
Federal financial assistance. The Title IX statute states: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance (US Department of Education 
(ED), n.d.).  
 
Intercollegiate athletic programs are considered educational programs thus making them eligible 
for federal funding. Therefore, they must fulfill the requirements of Title IX. The implementation 
of Title IX in these programs provides women and men equitable sport opportunities.  
1.1 History of Women’s Participation in Sports 
Prior to the early 1800’s, women’s participation in intercollegiate athletics was almost 
inconceivable. Prevailing cultural assumptions included a belief that males were innately more 
physical and interested in sports, whereas females were not emotionally or physically equipped 
for the competition and aggressive play that any sport required (Sabo & Snyder, 2013). Sports 
and athletic competition were targeted toward men since they were perceived as more robust and 
capable of enduring physical activity, while women were portrayed as fragile beings whose 
bodies could not withstand the overexertion of energy. Utilization of energy on sports was 
believed to be detrimental to their overall wellbeing since women experience menstrual cycles 
monthly. Having to endure the natural phenomenon of menstrual cycles subjected women to the 










dominant idea that women were not designed to play sport, far less participating in competitive 
events. 
 The drive for women’s participation in intercollegiate athletics gained more traction in 
the early 1800s. Sport for women began as what was considered relaxed play amongst each 
other. It was purely recreational, lacking in rules, emphasizing physical activity rather than 
competition, and was very informal (Bell, 2016). However, these notions were slowly being 
challenged by the evolving world around them. More people took notice of the wide range of 
athletic abilities on display by women during their recreational play. The increased exposure was 
pivotal for the future of women and their involvement in sport.  
The turn of the 19th century saw an increase in accessibility for higher education for 
women (Lewis, 2019). It is through this avenue that women were introduced to governed men's 
intercollegiate athletics. This sparked an interest in having their own form of competitive 
intercollegiate athletics. An array of sports organizations were created that aimed to endorse 
women’s programs, broaden participation, and increase exposure along with competitive aspects 
for intercollegiate competition among women. These organizations include the Committee on 
Women’s Athletics (CWA), the American Physical Education Association (APEA), the 
Women’s Division-National Amateur Athletic Federation (NAAF), Division for Girls and 
Women in Sports (DGWS), Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (CIAW), and 
the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW). Each association conquered its 
predecessor and provided more opportunities for women that paralleled what the National 










1910 as a discussion group and governing body for men’s sports. Women desired something 
similar.  
1.2 The Role of the NCAA 
Prior to Title IX, the NCAA had never displayed any interest in women’s athletics. This 
is, in part, due to the fact that there was nothing that required the NCAA's involvement 
concerning women's athletics (Bell, 2016). The enactment of Title IX and the strife for 
equivalence between male and female intercollegiate athletic programs drew an increased 
interest from the NCAA. The opportunity to control women’s athletic programs presented itself 
and the NCAA intended to grasp it. The NCAA needed to overrule the AIAW for control of 
women’s intercollegiate athletics and to govern the revenue stream which would increase as 
interest in women’s intercollegiate athletics grew. The NCAA did not want to be in competition 
with a separate governing association for women’s athletics, they sought sole control. As the 
NCAA grew in stature, the increased wealth, political influence, and outstanding history afforded 
them the chance to take over the AIAW (Bell, 2016). The NCAA offered to: (a) pay all expenses 
for teams competing in a national championship, (b) charge no additional membership fees for 
schools to add women’s programs, (c) create financial aid, recruitment, and eligibility rules that 
were equal for women and men, and finally, (d) guarantee women more television coverage 
(Bell, 2016). In doing this, the NCAA absorbed control of women’s athletic programs from the 
AIAW through lawsuits and setting aside three million dollars, which was to be used to support 











1.3 Effects of Title IX on the NCAA 
Described as the “little statute that could”, by an author from the Women’s Sports 
Foundation, Title IX helped to open the window of opportunity for girls and women in 
previously male-dominated fields and professions (Staurowsky et al., 2020). The implementation 
of Title IX helped grow women’s participation in intercollegiate athletics from 32,000 in 1971 to 
upwards of 64,000 by 1977. Title IX holds institutions to a set of standards aimed to grant 
women athletic opportunities equivalent to that of opportunities given to men. In 2004, the 
average number of teams offered for females per college/university was 8.32, up from 2.50 per 
school in 1972 (Acosta & Carpenter, 2014). In 1981-82, women's championships became a part 
of the NCAA program (Staurowsky et al., 2020). During the 2017-2018 season, there were 
216,378 female athletic opportunities offered by the NCAA member institutions (44.2%), 
representing a 291% increase from 1981-82 (Staurowsky et al., 2020). Today, the NCAA 
sponsors forty women's championships, thirty-eight men's championships, and three combined 
championships in all three of its divisions. As exemplified by the aforementioned statistics, Title 
















1.4 Title IX Compliance Requirements 
In order for an institution’s intercollegiate athletic program to be considered compliant 
with Title IX, the institution must prove compliance with three requirements, determined by the 
U.S Department of Education. The three requirements are as follows: 
(1) Participation: Title IX requires that women and men be provided equitable 
opportunities to participate in sports. Title IX does not require institutions to offer 
identical sports but an equal opportunity to play. 
(2) Scholarships: Title IX requires that female and male student-athletes receive athletics 
scholarship dollars proportional to their participation.  
(3) Other benefits: Title IX requires the equal treatment of female and male student-
athletes in the provisions of:  
(a) equipment and supplies; (b) scheduling of games and practice times; (c) travel 
and daily allowance/per diem; (d) access to tutoring; (e) coaching, (f) locker 
rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (g) medical and training facilities and 
services; (h) housing and dining facilities and services; (i) publicity and 
promotions; (j) support services and (k) recruitment of student-athletes (Title IX 
Frequently Asked Questions, 2014). 
 
An institution can demonstrate compliance with the participation requirement of Title IX 
by proving participation opportunities are equivalent to enrollment rates, showing a history and 
continuing practice of program expansion for the under-represented sex, or by showing 
accommodation of athletic interest and abilities (Judge & O’Brien, 2012). A substantial 
proportionality gap using data related to enrollment rates and participation for both genders is 
used to prove equivalence between enrollment rates and athletic participation. The NCAA’s Title 
IX and equity manual states that the, “OCR has refused to define ‘substantially proportionate’ 
using concrete percentage points, but rather has stated that it is to be determined on a case-by-










their numbers are “substantially proportionate (Judge & O’Brien, 2012).” With this knowledge, 
this research will test substantial proportionality gap compliance with a 5% and a 10% threshold. 
In order to demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program expansion, an 
institution needs accurate records of when teams were added or dropped from a program, and the 
effect that the additions or removal of teams had on the overall athletic participation numbers for 
men and women (Judge & O’Brien, 2012). According to the Office of Civil Rights, many 
institutions do not have this information readily available and therefore cannot know whether 
they comply with this test (Judge & O’Brien, 2012). For this reason, this study will not consider 
compliance with this part of the three-prong test because accurate data cannot be found.  
The final way to show compliance with the participation requirement is by showing  
 
accommodation of athletic interest and abilities. To do this, a program must show   
 
communication with the study body by using the following methods: 
 
1.Distribute athletics interest surveys to all current and admitted students of the  
underrepresented sex; 2. Make sure that there exists a publicized process whereby 
incoming and current students can request to add or elevate sports and evaluate and 
respond to all such requests); 3. Conduct ongoing reviews of the school’s club or 
intramural sport participation levels; 4. Keep up to date on the high school sports, 
amateur sports association and community sports leagues data and their respective 
participation levels in your geographical recruiting area; 5. Track the interscholastic 
athletics participation of admitted students; and 6. Conduct interviews and meetings with 
students, admitted students, coaches, administrators and others regarding interest in 
particular sports (Judge & O’Brien, 2012). 
 
As a result, schools must rely on survey data to show compliance with this part. This data is  
 
unattainable publicly and for this reason it will not be investigated in this study.  
 The final method that can be used by an institution to show compliance with the 










treatment of male and female student athletes. These benefits include maintenance of equipment 
and supplies, scheduling of games and practice times, travel and per diem expenses, opportunity 
to receive tutoring and assignment and compensation of tutors, opportunity to receive coaching, 
and assignment and compensation of coaches, provision of locker rooms, practice and 
competitive facilities, provision of medical and training services and facilities, provision of 
housing and dining services and facilities, publicity, support services, and recruiting (Judge & 
O’Brien, 2012). Compliance with this section becomes ambiguous because the law does not 
mandate identical benefits, opportunities or treatment in each area but rather provides that where 
members of one sex enjoy more favorable treatment in one area, such benefit must be “offset” by 
treatment in another area that favors members of the other sex  (Judge & O’Brien, 2012). The 
Office of Civil Rights assess compliance in this area by obtaining and analyzing information 
pertaining to benefits to either gender and by determining if the number of significant benefits 
provided to one gender is offset by the same number of significant benefits provided to the 
opposite sex. The significance of the benefits provided are situational and investigated by the 
Office of Civil Rights. Data for this requirement has been unattainable so we will not consider 















1.5 Research Questions 
The following questions assist in understanding the changes that the NCAA has 
experienced as a result of the implementation of Title IX in intercollegiate athletic programs. 
1. How has substantial proportionality evolved in the NCAA from 2003 to 2018?  
2. What percentage of institutions comply with the scholarship requirement of Title IX from 
2003 to 2018? 
3. What percent of institutions are compliant with Title IX? 
4. Hypothesis: The presence of a football team decreases the chance that an institution will 






















2. Literature Review 
This study will research NCAA compliance with Title IX across each division and 
determine what factors allow institutions to have a higher chance of compliance and determine if 
the presence of a football program has a significant effect on compliance. Currently, there is no 
published research that examines compliance with Title IX using a panel data model for binary 
dependent variables, to determine what areas an institution needs to improve in for better support 
of female athletes.  
2.1 Impact of Football on College Admissions and Academic Success 
 The impact of college football on the size of university applicant pools and the quality of 
entering students was researched in 2018. This was done using a panel dataset of 10 institutions 
that either added or eliminated college football between 1997 and 2015 (Caudill, Hourican, 
Mixon, 2018). It was found that the year after an institution eliminates football from its athletic 
program, the number of applicants at the institution decreases. This study uses ACT scores as a 
measure of the quality of students admitted since the ACT is a popular college entrance exam. 
This study also found that ACT scores decreased the year after the discontinuation of football 
(Caudill et al., 2018). A fixed-effects regression model was used to determine the relationships 
between variables that captured whether or not an institution has a football program, ACT scores, 
the historical prestige of the institutions, other characteristics of the institutions, and the size of 
an institution’s applicant pool. Interpretation of this model suggests that the presence of a 
football team increases interest at an institution, thus increasing the number of applicants 










A study published by the Wall Street Journal also examined records of enrollment, 
academic rankings, alumni giving, and research funding at Temple University to test if student 
and alumni engagement created by the Temple University football team has a positive impact on 
academic programs (Anonymous, 2016). Neil D. Theobald, the president of Temple, believes the 
presence of Temple’s successful football team draws attention from applicants. He stated, “our 
applications are up another 12% from last year’s record, and I expect another highly diverse, 
academically talented class to enroll in the fall (Anonymous, 2016).”  
2.2 Impact of Football on State Aid 
 Along with questioning whether or not football increases enrollment, the impact of 
athletic success on state appropriations has also been called to question. Men’s basketball, and 
football are usually the most popular sports, especially in Division I. The success of Men’s 
basketball and football were looked at in determining if athletic success increases state aid to 
institutions. Data from the Grapevine Project from the years 1983 to 2007 was used to report the 
state aid given to each institution, and data from both the College Football Data Warehouse and 
Massey Ratings were used to report win-loss records for the Football and Basketball teams. A 
simple regression model was used to measure the effects of university specific explanatory 
variables for Division I programs, and state specific controls on state appropriations (Alexander, 
Kern, 2010). Some of the explanatory variables included in the study were division 
classification, football wins, basketball wins, per capita income for each state, athletic 










percentage, the SEC would see an increase in state aid. A similar finding was made for a high 
men’s basketball win percentage for Big10.  
2.3 Compliance with Title IX 
A separate study looked at the reasoning behind gender inequity in Division I programs. 
Inequities were assessed using variables such as athletic participation, athletically related student 
aid, recruiting expenses, and total expenses (Leake, 2012). This study analyzes data from 343 
schools within Division I during the 2010-2011 academic year. The data used was downloaded 
from the Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool (EADA). Composite scores were then 
computed to determine the level of equitability in each institution in areas such as athletic 
participation, athletically related student aid, recruiting expenses, and total expenses, to illustrate 
gaps that remain within athletic programs in regard to Title IX. The data shows that 36.73% of 
DI schools meet the athletic participation requirement within five percent of proportionality, 
35.57% meet the scholarship requirement within five percent of proportionality, 19.83% had 
equitable recruiting expenses between men and women, and 17.49% had equitable overall 
expenses between men and women (Leake, 2012).  T-tests and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
were used to determine whether having a football program affected the researched variables. The 
results show that having a football program has a statistical significance with athletically related 
student aid and that fewer than 37% of schools display gender equality in athletic participation, 
athletically related aid, recruiting expenses, and total expenses when allowing for a five percent 










 Another study, done by Anderson, Cheslock, & Ehrenberg (2006) determines the level of 
non-compliance with Title IX as measured by the substantial proportionality gap from 1995-
1996 and 2001-2002, and investigates why some institutions have a better gap than others. Non-
compliance is defined as a gap over 5%. The study uses a set of explanatory variables in a 
regression to explain the extent of noncompliance in institutions. This is done by examining the 
determinants of the substantial proportionality gaps and estimating OLS cross-section 
regressions from 1995 to 1996 than from 2001 to 2002. Then, the first difference in regressions 
is analyzed. It was found that there was a 90-93% decrease of the sample in 1995/96 to about a 
82-89% decrease of the sample in 2001/02 (Anderson, Cheslock, Ehrenberg, 2006). The 
regression also showed that region of the institution was significant, schools in the south and 
Midwest regions were worse off with compliance than institutions in the Northeast and West 
regions. Institutions with lower selectivity, less financial wealth, a larger female share of 
undergraduates, and a smaller undergraduate student body are all associated with a large 
proportionality gap, all else equal (Anderson et al., 2006). Finally, the effect that membership 
divisions and football had on compliance were examined. The regression results show that 
membership division is likely to influence the number of male and female athletes that 
participate in intercollegiate athletics in an institution, and the presence of a football team is 
associated with a proportionality gap that is approximately 8.5% larger than that proportionality 












2.4 40 Year Anniversary of Title IX 
The NCAA published its own report for the 40 year anniversary of Title IX, to reflect on 
improvements made in intercollegiate athletic programs since it’s passing. The report shows 
changes in participation opportunities, resources allocations, and leadership positions, between 
men and women. The data for this report is downloaded from the Equity in Athletics Data 
Analysis Cutting Tool (EADA). The data shows that from the early 2000’s to about 2011, men’s 
intercollegiate sport participation has grown by 43,056 opportunities, exceeding women’s 37,530 
new participation slots by 5,526 (Wilson, 2012). Graphs in the report show that Division I has 
the highest female participation rate with 46% of opportunities for women who are on average 
53% of the undergraduate population on DI campuses, Division II has the largest participation 
gap between men and women of all three NCAA Divisions, and that DIII has the most member 
institutions but offers over 6,000 fewer participation opportunities for women than DI (Wilson, 
2012). Another important point made in this study is the allocation of funds for teams. In 2010, It 
was found that Division I programs spent 73% of the men’s budget on football and basketball, 
while Division II and Division III portions of the men’s budget for football and men’s basketball 
were 54% and 41% (Wilson, 2012). Division I programs offer more equitable participation 
opportunities for male and female athletes but have the greatest difference in total expenses at 
60% for men and 40% for women. When looking at Division I programs that don’t have football 
teams, it was found that spending is actually more equitable between men and women. For 
Division II and Division III schools, it was found that there is a lower percentage of total 










between male and female programs (Wilson, 2012). Other important findings in this report 
encompass participation rates by race, the use of emerging sports in programs to boost 
participation opportunities for women, and the dropping of men’s teams to reduce the amount of 
male athletic opportunities. The report finalizes by detailing the inequity found in administrative 
roles in athletes as well.  
3. Methodology 
Research Question 1: How has substantial proportionality evolved in the NCAA from 2003 to 
2018?  
Compliance with the participation component of Title IX requires an institution to meet 
one of three other independent tests known as the three-part test, or the three-prong test. The 
three-part test allows an institution to prove that it offers proportional athletic opportunities by 
showing that the proportion of male to female enrolled undergraduates is equivalently 
proportional to the male to female athletic ratio. They can also meet the requirement by 
displaying consistent expansion of opportunities provided to the underrepresented sex or by 
demonstrating that it meets all the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex (WSF, 
2004). 
For the purposes of this research, the focus will remain on the substantial proportionality 
gap to show an institutions compliance with the participation requirement. The substantial 
proportionality gap shows the difference between the percentage of female enrolled 
undergraduates and the percentage of female student athletes at an institution. The dataset 










athletes. The Department of Education uses the unduplicated count in research, so this paper will 
follow suit. The difference between the duplicated and the unduplicated counts is the amount of 
times an athlete is counted in the data. A duplicated count, counts an athlete for each sport he or 
she participates in. The unduplicated count only counts the athlete once despite possible 
participation on multiple teams. Using the duplicated count, a positive proportionality gap shows 
that there is a higher percentage of females enrolled as undergraduates at an institution than the 
percentage of student athletes who are female. A zero proportionality gap shows that the 
percentage of females who are student athletes is the same as the percentage of females enrolled 
as undergraduates. A negative proportionality gap shows that females who are student athletes 
comprise a larger percentage than the percentage of females who are enrolled in undergrad. For 
this study a substantial proportionality gap less than five percent or less than ten percent, will be 
deemed compliant. 
The substantial proportionality gap was calculated and averaged for each NCAA 
Division: Division I, Division II, and Division III every year between 2003 and 2018. Results of 
these calculations show a steady decrease in the substantial proportionality gap in each division 
from 2003 to about 2014. This shows improvement for female athletes because a smaller gap 
means that the percentage of female athletes is getting closer to the percentage of females 
enrolled in undergrad. The Graphs for Division I and Division II show a slight increase in the 
substantial proportionality gap from 2016 to 2018, while Division III shows a slight increase 
from 2013 to 2015. These findings conclude that the percentage of male athletes in 










Reasoning behind these spikes are not researched in this paper but should be considered for 
future examination. Graphs 1, 2, and 3 display the change in the duplicated substantial 
proportionality gap for all NCAA Divisions between 2003 and 2018. 
The average substantial proportionality gap for the NCAA as a whole from the years 
2003 to 2018 was calculated as 10.01%. This is larger than the 5% level of compliance, deeming 
the NCAA schools on average not compliant with the substantial participation gap. Division II 
programs comprise a large percentage of the overall gap, as they are shown to have the largest 
calculated substantial proportionality gaps out of all divisions. The calculated gap for Division II 
is 14.59% which is almost double the gap calculated for Division I. Division I programs have the 
smallest calculated average substantial proportionality gap at 7.42%. With this study we must 
remember only the first part of the three-part test for participation compliance is being 
investigated. Schools are also able to prove compliance by showing a history of expanding 
participation opportunities for the underrepresented sex, or by proving that the institution 
effectively accommodates the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. This is 
important to remember because a portion of schools who fail to show compliance with the 
substantial proportionality gap may be compliant with another part of the three-part test. The 
average substantial proportionality gaps for each division is shown in Table 5.  
Research question 2: What percentage of institutions comply with the scholarship requirement of 
Title IX from 2003 to 2018? 
Under Title IX, it is required that male and female student-athletes receive athletic based 










compliance with this section, the ratio of scholarships given to male and female participants 
needs to be compared to the ratio of male to female participants. Unlike the calculations for the 
substantial proportionality gap, calculations for athletic participation when comparing it to the 
ratio of athletic scholarships use the unduplicated counts of participants. This is because each 
athlete only receives one scholarship for one team they are a part of, scholarships are not given 
out for each team an athlete decides to participate on. It is important to note here that Division III 
programs are excluded from this portion because they do not award athletic based scholarships.  
Division I and Division II programs have a larger percentage of male student athletes 
than they do female student athletes, as shown in table 6. Division II programs have 20.26% 
more male student athletes than female student athletes on average, while Division I programs 
have a 11.85 % difference between the male and female student athletes on average. This trend 
was also seen when calculating the substantial proportionality gaps for each Division. Table 6 
also shows that Division I and Division II programs award male student athletes more athletic 
aid than women.   
Similar to the substantial proportionality gap, a difference between the percentage of 
female athletes who receive athletic aid is compared to the percentage of male athletes that 
receive athletic aid. A positive difference represents females receiving more athletic based aid 
than males, a negative difference represents males receiving more athletic based aid than 
females, and a zero result shows the portion of athletic based aid given to males and females is 
equivalent. On average, Division I programs show a decrease in the gap of athletic aid 










maintained and then there was a series of increases and decreases from 2013 to 2018. Division II 
programs follow a similar trend from 2003 to 2018. The difference between the two divisions is 
that the average gap for Division I is calculated as -8.959, while it is calculated to be -12.77961 
for Division II. This shows that as each division saw the same trend in decreasing the gap, 
maintaining the gap, and then experiencing a volatile gap. Division I programs had a much 
smaller average gap than Division II programs. Graph 4 and Graph 5 represent the changes in the 
Average gap of athletic aid distributed to male and female student athletes.  
Research Question 3: What percent of institutions are compliant with Title IX? 
In this research, an institution will be labeled compliant with the Department of 
Education’s Title IX requirements if it meets the substantial proportionality gap requirement for 
participation and the scholarship requirement since we are unable to obtain data for the third 
requirement. Institutions with a substantial proportionality gap less than 5% comply with the 
participation requirement, showing that the number of females participating in intercollegiate 
athletics is close to or greater than the proportion of women enrolled as undergraduates at the 
institution. This research will also explore the percentage of institutions that comply with a 
substantial proportionality gap less than 10%. An institution will be compliant with the financial 
aid requirement if the ratio of financial aid distributed to male and female student athletes, is 
within 5% or 10% of the ratio of male to female student athletes. The financial aid requirement is 
only applied to Division I and Division II institutions since Division III institutions do not 
distribute athletic based scholarships. Ivy Leagues chose not to distribute athletic based 










are compliant with both the participation and financial aid requirements with the 5% or 10% 
thresholds. 
Compliance rates for each division and for the NCAA as a whole have been calculated 
with the 5% threshold previously identified for the participation and financial aid requirements. 
Findings show low percentages overall. 9.09% of institutions that are Division I are compliant 
with the participation and scholarship requirements, while less than 5% of Division II programs 
are compliant. Division III has a higher percentage at 28.29% because its institutions do not give 
athletic based scholarships, so their compliance is being based on the substantial proportionality 
gap. Looking at just Division I and Division II programs, it is found that 11.15% of these 
institutions are compliant. The NCAA overall has a poor showing of 7.34% compliance. These 
calculated rates could be found in table 7a.  
The compliance rates for each division and the NCAA overall were also calculated at a 
10% threshold. Division I compliance saw a 16.50 percentage point increase, Division II 
programs saw a percentage point increase of 8, and Division III program saw a 21 percentage 
point increase in compliance. The number of institutions that were able to comply at the 10% 
threshold can be found in table 7b. Overall, 25.89% of NCAA institutions comply with a 
substantial proportionality gap of less than 10% and a financial aid ratio that is within 10% of the 














H0: The presence of a football team decreases the chance that an institution will comply with 
Title IX. 
H1: The presence of a football team increases the chance that an institution will comply with 
Title IX. 
5. Data 
The data used in this research is derived from the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act 
(EADA). The EADA is an apparatus used by the Department of Education. It was created to 
serve as a platform to store athletic data retrieved from institutions that receive federal funding. 
Institutions are required to annually submit information regarding revenues, expenses, salaries, 
scholarships, etc. into the EADA database. The data downloaded for this research is composed of 
information from 2003-2018 for all four-year public NCAA institutions in Division I, Division 
II, and Division III.  
The independent variables used in this research consist of the number of females enrolled 
as undergraduates, the number of women who participate on intercollegiate athletic teams, 
revenue drawn in from women’s teams, expenses spent on women’s teams, NCAA division, and 
the presence of a football team. The EADA includes revenues from appearances, contributions 
from alumni, institutional royalties, signage, sponsorships, sport camps, state or government 
support, student activity fees, ticket sales, box sales, and any other revenues attributable to 
intercollegiate athletic activity. The expense variable includes athletically related student aid, 










recruiting expenses, salaries and benefits, supplies, travel, and any other expenses attributable to 
intercollegiate athletic activities.  
6. Results 
To determine the effect that football has on compliance, a panel data model for binary 
dependent variables is run. Tables 8 and 9 show the results of the panel probit regressions as 
more variables are added to the original models. Since using a panel probit regression, the 
coefficients cannot be interpreted directly as how the respective variable changes the probability 
of compliance, but instead offers qualitative information. We can only identify if a variable is 
more or less likely to aid an institution’s probability of complying with certain factors of the 
Title IX requirements. To determine the magnitude of the effect, the marginal effects of each 
variable in the final model will be calculated. Table 8 represents institutions that have a 
substantial proportionality gap that is less than 5% and a financial aid ratio within 5% of the 
male to female athletic participation ratio. Table 9 represents institutions that have a substantial 
proportionality gap that is less than 10% and a financial aid ratio within 10% of the male to 
female athletic participation ratio. It is important to remember that this study only looks at 
compliance with the substantial proportionality gap and with the financial aid ratio. When we 
identify compliance with Title IX, this is what is being referenced. First, we will identify the 
significant variables in each model. 
Model 1 looks at the effects that the percentages of female enrollment, participation, 
athletic revenues, and athletic expenses have on an institution's chance of Title IX compliance at 










significant and positive impact on the probability of complying with Title IX. This increase leads 
to an institution being less likely to comply with Title IX, all else held constant, in comparison to 
an increase in the percentage of male enrollment. It can be concluded that the percentage of 
female athletes has a significant and opposite effect on compliance than enrollment. This in turn 
has potential to further increase likelihood of compliance by allowing a rise in the participation 
rates of female athletes. Widening the threshold to 10%, increases the number of institutions 
compliant with Title IX. The previous effects of increasing women’s enrollment and athletic 
participation still hold true. The difference between the two thresholds for this model is that the 
percentage of revenues produced from women’s athletics is insignificant. Furthermore, this 
highlights the significance of income generated from women's athletics. As the percentage of 
generated revenues from women increases, all else held constant, schools will be more likely to 
comply, as opposed to an increase in male generated revenues. 
Dummy variables for the years 2004 to 2018 are generated and added to the second panel 
data probit models run in Tables 8 and 9. The models share similarities and differences at each 
threshold. The percentage of women’s athletic participation is deemed significant in both 
models. As the percentage of women participating on an institution's sports team increases, so 
does the institution's probability of compliance with Title IX, whereas an increase in expenditure 
on female sports teams reduces probability of compliance, all else held constant. This is in 
comparison to programs that see an increase in the percentage of male student athletes or an 
increase in men’s athletic expenditure, all else held constant. Longitudinally we can compare the 










2018. Institutions in these years are more likely to comply with Title IX than in 2003, all else 
held constant. At the 10% threshold, years 2007 and 2009 are significant and have a positive 
relationship with the probability of compliance, all else held constant. With regards to 
differences in the models, the percentage of women’s expenses only has a significant effect on 
compliance at the 5% threshold while the percentage of women’s enrollment only has a 
significant effect at the 10% threshold. An institution increasing the percentage of money spent 
on women’s teams will reduce their likelihood of compliance with Title IX at the 5% threshold, 
all else held constant. Furthermore, as institutions notice an increase in female enrollment, the 
probability of compliance with Title IX is more likely to occur, this is opposed to an increase in 
the percentage of men enrolled, all else held equal at the 10% threshold. 
In determining the effect of division membership (Division I, II, III) and its effect on the 
likelihood of compliance, dummy variables for Division II and III are added to the model whilst 
Division I serves as a reference. Institutions are less likely to comply with Title IX at both 5% 
and 10% threshold upon experiencing an increase in the percentage of females enrolled, all else 
held constant. This is in stark contrast to an increase in the percentage of males enrolled.  When 
considering the percentage of female student athletes, this will have the opposite effect. It is 
noted that a rise in the percent of female student athletes at an institution will drive an increase in 
the probability of compliance. As for membership, institutions belonging to Division III are 
significant at each threshold. These schools are more likely to comply with Title IX in 
comparison to Division I institutions, all else held constant. Division II only demonstrates 










to be compliant in comparison to Division I, all else held constant. Models 3, tables 8 and 9 
exemplify the aforementioned results.  
Model 4 includes a dummy variable for football. The purpose behind this is to determine 
if the presence of a football team in an athletic program has an effect on its ability to comply 
with requirements of Title IX. As exemplified in previous models, both the percentage of female 
enrollment and percentage of female athletes are significant at the 5% and 10% thresholds and 
have similar effects on compliance. Also significant to both models are the Division II and 
Division III membership divisions. Division II institutions are less likely to comply with Title IX 
and Division III institutions are more likely to comply with Title IX in comparison to Division I, 
all else held constant. Football is not significant to the models at either threshold.  
To further explore the effects that football can have on compliance, we interact each 
division with football to highlight the effect that a specific division (with a football program) can 
have on the probability of compliance. Similar to previous models, the percentage of 
undergraduate females, the percentage of female participants in athletics, and the dummy 
variable for Division III are all significant. The effects they have on the probability of 
compliance, remains the same from the previous models. Division II programs with football do 
not have a significant effect on compliance at the 5% threshold but there is a significant effect at 
the 10% threshold. Division II programs that have football teams are less likely to comply with 
Title IX when compared to Division I programs with football, all else held constant. Similarly, 










comparison to Division I programs at the 10% threshold but hold no significance at 5%, all else 
held constant. 
7. Discussion 
This study focuses on factors that influence intercollegiate athletic compliance with 
regards to the first two requirements of Title IX, as mandated by the Department of Education 
under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. In order to analyze the effects of enrollment, revenue, and 
expense factors, a panel data model for binary dependent variables was utilized. Two separate 
binary panel data regressions were run. The first one deemed an institution compliant with 
specific factors of Title IX if it complied with the substantial proportionality gap and the 
financial aid ratio at a 5% threshold, while the second one deemed an institution compliant with 
the same factors at a 10% threshold. 
It was hypothesized that the presence of football reduces an institution’s probability of 
compliance with the first two requirements for gender equity in athletics, Title IX. Football is a 
significant estimator of compliance when interacted with Division II and Division III only when 
considering the substantial proportionality gap is less than 10%, and the financial aid ratio is 
within 10% of the athletic participation ratio. The marginal effects are shown in tables 11. There 
is a significant, negative relationship between being a part of a Division II program with football 
and Title IX compliance; this simply meaning that the presence of football teams makes it less 
likely for Division II programs to be compliant in comparison to Division I programs. The 
marginal effects show that a Division II institution with a football program is 6.42% less likely to 










marginal effect for a Division III institution with a football team shows that an institution is 
4.24% less likely to comply with the specified requirements of Title IX in comparison to 
Division I programs with football, all else held constant. This finding agrees with the marginal 
effects of being a part of a Division III program. Division III programs have shown to have a 
higher probability of complying with Title IX than Division II programs do. 
The percentage of females enrolled at an institution is significant in determining the 
likelihood of compliance with the substantial proportionality gap and financial aid ratios that an 
institution can justify for compliance. The marginal effect in table 10 shows that a program that 
experiences a 1% percent increase in female enrollment, the institution is 3.17% less likely to 
comply with Title IX than if there was an increase in men’s enrollment, all else held constant. 
The marginal effects in table 11 show that a 1% increase in undergraduate, female, enrollment 
will lead an institution to be 5.03% less likely to comply with Title IX when compared to a 1% 
increase in male enrollment. All other variables are held constant. These findings are expected 
since women’s enrollment rates are already high, and institutions have a difficult time meeting 
the substantial proportionality gap. Increasing the population of undergraduate women will only 
widen the gap further. 
A complete opposite impact on compliance with Title IX is noted when looking at the 
percentage of females who participate on intercollegiate athletic teams. The marginal effect in 
table 10 highlights that with a 1% percent increase in females who participate on intercollegiate 
athletic teams, an institution is 8.17% less likely to comply with Title IX than if there were an 










effects on a 1% increase in participation by female athletes makes an institution 15.82% more 
likely to comply with Title IX in comparison to an increase in male participation, all else is held 
equal. This is yet another expected find, since the implementation of Title IX within athletic 
programs is to promote equal participation for women as compared to men. 
When contrasted against the reference category, Division I, the probability of compliance 
for Division III is found to be significant. The marginal effect for Division III demonstrates a 
21.87% increase in the probability of compliance, all else held constant. These findings agree 
with the findings shown in tables 7a and 7b, which display the number of institutions deemed 
compliant with a substantial proportionality gap less than 5%/10% and financial aid ratio within 
5%/10% of the athletic participation ratios respectively. Table 7a shows 9.09% of Division I 
programs are compliant with the first two requirements of Title IX, 4.60% of Division II 
institutions show compliance, and 28.29% of Division III institutions are compliant. Table 7b 
shows 25.59% of Division I programs, 12.60% of Division II programs, and 49.92% of Division 
III programs are compliant. One factor of note that distinguishes Division III from Division I and 
II programs is that Division III programs do not award athletic based scholarships. This in turn 
makes it easier for Division III programs given that they have less factors to worry about in 
terms of compliance.  
In moving forward, critically thinking on the basis of the hypothesis, and the recent 
worldwide pandemic that is COVID-19 analyzing the impact that lack of sport has had on the 
NCAA, if any, could be beneficial. The genesis of the COVID-19 pandemic led to cancellation 










spring athletes. This would provide them the opportunity to utilize this eligibility in a potential 
fifth year of academics. The participation numbers for the 2019-2020 athletic year should be 
significantly lower than the results of years prior. Revenues and expenses are two important 
factors that are directly affected since there were no sports being played. It could be noteworthy 
to analyze what issues, if any, the virus imposes on athletic programs across all divisions having 
to manage their student athlete population, in addition to how each division handles the issues 
imposed on their athletic programs. Division III athletic programs may face some of the same 
issues as the higher divisions, however all things considered, it can be expected that major 
Division I & II programs would be most affected. Particularly considering the powerhouse 
Division I programs who have the ability to generate sizable revenue on a game to game basis.  
8. Conclusion 
The present study provides insight into how the NCAA has coped with the enforcement 
of Title IX in intercollegiate athletic programs from 2003 to 2018. Findings derived from this 
research, although limited, can serve as a foundation for further insight into characteristics that 
can aid in compliance. The most pivotal factors in complying with Title IX are enrollment rates 
and participation of women in sports as identified through the present study's findings. In 
progressing forward the NCAA could potentially consider establishing stricter provisions in an 
effort to ensure compliance in Divisions I, II and III. The goal behind such efforts would be to 
raise the compliance percentage which, in turn, would reduce the gender disparity amongst their 
athlete population. Even investigating the third requirement for Title IX, which seeks 










another caveat that could also benefit the NCAA in their efforts to maintain compliance. This in 
turn could reap enormous benefits for the NCAA, from both a business perspective, to that of the 
athlete population and fans alike. 
 Furthermore, this concludes the preliminary investigation into Title IX compliance 
across all three athletic Divisions in the NCAA, progressing forward targeted research on Title 
































Table 1: Undergraduate Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
maleundergraduates 7192 4565.502 3848.177 247 24950 
femaleundergraduates 7192 5244.624 3987.061 82 25505 
totalundergraduates 7192 9810.126 7728.384 621 50394 
   
Table 2: Participation Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
grandtotalmensparticipation 7192 231.162 95.162 30 641 
grandtotalwomensparticipation 7192 185.895 89.323 30 589 
unduplicatedcountmensparticipati 7192 202.671 81.984 1 576 
unduplicatedcountwomensparticipa 7192 150.968 71.132 1 505 
  
Table 3: Athletic Aid Summary 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
mensteamathleticstudentaid 7192 $1,642,413 1855963 0 1.47e+07 
womensteamathleticstudentaid 7192 $1,314,323 1485893 0 1.22e+07 
  
Table 4: Revenue and Expense Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
totalmensteamrevenue 7192 $9,818,817 1.96e+07 $2,327 1.82e+08 
totalwomensteamrevenue 7192 $2,381,092 2530000 $534 2.45e+07 
totalmensteamexpenses 7192 $7,358,979 1.17e+07 $42,775 1.01e+08 


















Table 5: Average Substantial Proportionality Gap per Division at 5% 
NCAA Division Average Substantial Proportionality Gap 
Division I 7.423592 
Division II 14.58593 
Division III 9.154203 
Total 10.01391 
 
Table 6: Average Aid Per Gender for Each Division 
NCAA Division Avg. Female Aid 
Distributed (%) 
Avg. Female Student 
Athletes (%) 
Avg. Male Aid 
Distributed (%) 
Avg. Male Student 
Athletes (%) 
Division I 45.5204 44.07621 54.4796 55.92379      
Division II 43.6102 39.8686 56.3898 60.1314      
Division III   43.14262   56.85738      
Total 44.78098 42.5696 55.21902 57.4304      
  
Table 7a: Compliance by Division (Substantial Proportionality Gap <5%, Financial Aid Ratio within 5%) 
NCAA Division Compliance 
  0 1 Total 
Division I 3,272 327 3,599 
Division II 2,180 105 2,285 
Division III 938 370 1,308 
Total 6,390 802 7,192 
 
Table 7b: Compliance by Division (Substantial Proportionality Gap <10%, Financial Aid Ratio within 10%) 
NCAA Division Compliance 
  0 1 Total 
Division I 2,678 921 3,599 
Division II 1,997 288 2,285 
Division III 655 653 1,308 















Table 8:  Binary Panel Probit Regression Results 5% 
                                                   (1)                      (2)                   (3)                     (4)                     (5)    
                                           compliance5     compliance5     compliance5     compliance5     compliance5    
 
lnfemundergrad                         -0.406***       -0.233              -0.305*             -0.308*            -0.306*   
                                                  (-3.45)             (-1.92)              (-2.55)             (-2.57)              (-2.56)    
lntotalwomenparti                     1.173***        1.119***           0.789***         0.796***         0.791*** 
                                                  (6.33)              (5.99)                (4.04)               (4.07)              (4.05)    
lnwomensrev                             0.123*            0.0193               0.0228             0.0224              0.0231    
                                                  (2.46)              (0.36)                (0.42)               (0.41)              (0.43)    
lnwomensexp                            -0.0983           -0.259*              0.139               0.149               0.148    
                                                  (-0.99)             (-2.50)              (1.01)               (1.08)               (1.06)    
y2004                                                                0.0260              -0.00910           -0.0105            -0.0108    
                                                                          0.14)                (-0.05)              (-0.06)              (-0.06)    
y2005                                                                0.162                0.0852              0.0824             0.0825    
                                                                          (0.91)               (0.47)               (0.46)               (0.46)    
y2006                                                                0.185                0.0769              0.0725             0.0724    
                                                                          (1.03)               (0.42)               (0.40)               (0.40)    
y2007                                                                 0.189               0.0338              0.0290             0.0284    
                                                                          (1.03)               (0.18)               (0.15)               (0.15)    
y2008                                                                0.151               - 0.0232            -0.0293            -0.0300    
                                                                         (0.82)               (-0.12)               (-0.15)              (-0.16)    
y2009                                                                0.289               0.115                 0.109                0.108    
                                                                          (1.57)              (0.61)                (0.58)                (0.57)    
y2010                                                                0.480**           0.285                 0.278                0.277    
                                                                          (2.67)              (1.54)                (1.50)                (1.49)    
y2011                                                                0.481**           0.265                 0.258                0.256    
                                                                          (2.63)              (1.40)                (1.36)                (1.35)    
y2012                                                                0.527**           0.305                 0.298                 0.297    
                                                                          (2.89)              (1.61)                (1.57)                (1.56)    
y2013                                                                0.601***         0.354                 0.346                 0.345    
                                                                          (3.29)              (1.85)                (1.81)                (1.80)    
y2014                                                                0.498**           0.232                 0.224                 0.223    
                                                                          (2.68)              (1.19)                (1.14)                 (1.14)    
y2015                                                                0.519**           0.236                 0.225                 0.225    
                                                                          (2.78)              (1.19)                (1.13)                 (1.13)    
y2016                                                                 0.613**          0.316                 0.300                  0.284    
                                                                          (3.28)              (1.58)                (1.50)                 (1.40)    
y2017                                                                0.573**           0.257                 0.242                  0.226    
                                                                          (3.03)              (1.27)                (1.18)                 (1.09)    
y2018                                                                0.580**           0.242                 0.226                  0.210    
                                                                          (3.03)              (1.17)                (1.08)                  (0.99)    
2.division                                                                                   -0.416              -0.429*               -0.364    
                                                                                                 (-1.95)               (-2.00)                 (-1.23)    
3.division                                                                                 1.535***           1.492***             1.516*** 
                                                                                                 (4.57)                 (4.38)                 (4.08)    
1.football                                                                                                           -0.0978             - 0.0582    
                                                                                                                            (-0.77)                (-0.23)    
d2football                                                                                                                                      -0.0536    
                                                                                                                                                      (-0.35)    
d3football                                                                                                                                      0.0178    
                                                                                                                                                       (0.15)    
_cons                                           -5.242***     -2.962**          -6.419***         -6.499***           -6.512*** 
                                                     (-5.82)          (-3.03)             (-4.17)              (-4.21)                  (-4.22)    
/lnsig2u                                        0.946***      0.897***           0.751***         0.746***            0.743*** 
                                                     (7.22)           (6.88)               (5.73)                (5.68)                  (5.63)    
N                                                  7192              7192                 7192                7192                    7192    
















Table 9: Binary Panel Probit Regression Results 10% 
                                                     (1)                      (2)                     (3)                    (4)                   (5) 
                                             compliance10    compliance10    compliance10  compliance10   compliance10 
lnfemundergrad                        -0.356***        -0.226*           -0.294**             -0.294**           -0.292**  
                                                 (-3.62)              (-2.20)            (-2.95)                 (-2.96)              (-2.96)    
lntotalwomenparti                    1.228***          1.178***        0.913***             0.925***          0.921*** 
                                                 (8.69)               (8.27)              (6.28)                  (6.36)                (6.34)    
lnwomensrev                            0.0445             -0.0280           -0.0245               -0.0238              -0.0227    
                                                 (1.31)               (-0.75)             (-0.66)                (-0.64)                (-0.61)    
lnwomensexp                           -0.0456            -0.166              0.180                  0.197                 0.160    
                                                 (-0.58)              (-1.96)            (1.64)                  (1.79)                 (1.46)    
y2004                                                                0.0682            0.0457                 0.0444               0.0465    
                                                                         (0.54)              (0.36)                  (0.35)                 (0.37)    
y2005                                                                0.0208            -0.0379                -0.0433              -0.0362    
                                                                          (0.16)             (-0.30)                (-0.34)                 (-0.28)    
y2006                                                               -0.0203           -0.105                  -0.111                 -0.104    
                                                                         (-0.16)            (-0.80)                  (-0.85)                (-0.79)    
y2007                                                                0.261*            0.136                  0.127                   0.139    
                                                                         (2.01)              (1.03)                 (0.96)                   (1.04)    
y2008                                                                0.240              0.0977                0.0885                  0.102    
                                                                         (1.82)              (0.72)                 (0.66)                   (0.75)    
y2009                                                               0.277*             0.132                  0.123                    0.135    
                                                                         (2.08)              (0.97)                 (0.89)                   (0.98)    
y2010                                                               0.363**           0.199                  0.187                   0.201    
                                                                         (2.71)              (1.44)                 (1.35)                   (1.45)    
y2011                                                                0.432**          0.253                  0.241                   0.253    
                                                                         (3.20)              (1.80)                 (1.72)                   (1.80)    
y2012                                                               0.331*             0.142                  0.129                   0.146    
                                                                         (2.41)              (1.00)                 (0.90)                   (1.02)    
y2013                                                               0.430**           0.220                  0.207                   0.225    
                                                                        (3.11)               (1.52)                 (1.43)                   (1.55)    
y2014                                                               0.324*             0.100                  0.0857                 0.105    
                                                                         (2.32)              (0.68)                 (0.58)                   (0.71)    
y2015                                                               0.395**           0.154                  0.137                   0.161    
                                                                         (2.81)              (1.03)                 (0.91)                  (1.07)    
y2016                                                               0.432**           0.180                  0.146                   0.157    
                                                                         (3.05)              (1.19)                 (0.96)                  (1.02)    
y2017                                                               0.355*             0.0867               0.0539                 0.0661    
                                                                         (2.48)              (0.56)                 (0.35)                  (0.42)    
y2018                                                               0.346*             0.0594                0.0250                 0.0394    
                                                                         (2.38)              (0.38)                 (0.16)                  (0.25)    
2.division                                                                                -0.478**             -0.501**              -0.00573    
                                                                                                (-2.71)                (-2.83)                  (-0.02)    
3.division                                                                                 1.567***           1.483***              1.866*** 
                                                                                                 (5.56)                (5.21)                   (6.05)    
1.football                                                                                                           -0.189                   0.381    
                                                                                                                           (-1.89)                  (1.87)    
d2football                                                                                                                                       -0.373**  
                                                                                                                                                        (-3.09)    
d3football                                                                                                                                       -0.247*   
                                                                                                                                                        (-2.40)    
_cons                                        -4.531***       -2.836***        -5.938***          -6.109***            -6.027*** 
                                                 (-6.02)              (-3.34)            (-4.71)               (-4.84)                   (-4.81)    
 
/lnsig2u                                    0.816***           0.781***          0.608***         0.599***              0.573*** 
                                                 (7.61)               (7.32)                (5.71)              (5.64)                    (5.36) 
N                                               7192                 7192                 7192                7192                      7192 
t statistics in parentheses 










Table 10: Marginal effects, Substantial Proportionality Gap <5%, Financial Aid Ratio within 5% 
Average marginal effects                                                       Number of obs  =  7,192 
Model VCE : OIM 
Expression   : Pr(compliance5=1), predict(pr) 
dy/dx w.r.t. : lnfemundergrad 
Delta-method 
  dy/dx Std.Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lnfemundergrad -0.0316506 0.0124214 -2.55 0.011 -0.056           -0.007 
lntotalwomenparti 0.0817452 0.0202492 4.04 0.000 0.042             0.121 
3.division 0.2187221 0.0591896 3.70 0.000 0.102           0.335 
  
Table 11: Marginal effects, Substantial Proportionality Gap <10%, Financial Aid Ratio within 10% 
Average marginal effects                                                       Number of obs  =  7,192 
Model VCE : OIM 
Expression   : Pr(compliance10=1), predict(pr) 
dy/dx w.r.t. : lnfemundergrad 
Delta-method 
  dy/dx Std.Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lnfemundergrad -0.0502575 0.0169748 -2.96 0.003 -0.084           -0.017 
lntotalwomenparti 0.1582598 0.0248849 6.36 0.000 0.109             0.207 
3.division 0.3790733 0.0570771 6.46 0.000 0.267             0.491 
d2*football -0.064175 0.0207732 -3.09 0.002 -0.105           -0.023 
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